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Research in North Sea Economics has been conducted in the Economics Department 
since 1973.  The present and likely future effects of oil and gas developments on the 
Scottish economy formed the subject of a long term study undertaken for the Scottish 
Office.  The final report of this study, The Economic Impact of North Sea Oil on 
Scotland, was published by HMSO in 1978.  In more recent years further work has 
been done on the impact of oil on local economies and on the barriers to entry and 
characteristics of the supply companies in the offshore oil industry. 
 
The second and longer lasting theme of research has been an analysis of licensing and 
fiscal regimes applied to petroleum exploitation.  Work in this field was initially 
financed by a major firm of accountants, by British Petroleum, and subsequently by 
the Shell Grants Committee.  Much of this work has involved analysis of fiscal 
systems in other oil producing countries including Australia, Canada, the United 
States, Indonesia, Egypt, Nigeria and Malaysia.  Because of the continuing interest in 
the UK fiscal system many papers have been produced on the effects of this regime. 
 
From 1985 to 1987 the Economic and Social Science Research Council financed 
research on the relationship between oil companies and Governments in the UK, 
Norway, Denmark and The Netherlands.  A main part of this work involved the 
construction of Monte Carlo simulation models which have been employed to 
measure the extents to which fiscal systems share in exploration and development 
risks. 
 
Over the last few years the research has examined the many evolving economic issues 
generally relating to petroleum investment and related fiscal and regulatory matters.  
Subjects researched include the economics of incremental investments in mature oil 
fields, economic aspects of the CRINE initiative, economics of gas developments and 
contracts in the new market situation, economic and tax aspects of tariffing, 
economics of infrastructure cost sharing, the effects of comparative petroleum fiscal 
systems on incentives to develop fields and undertake new exploration, the oil price 
responsiveness of the UK petroleum tax system, and the economics of 
decommissioning, mothballing and re-use of facilities.  This work has been financed 
by a group of oil companies and Scottish Enterprise, Energy.  The work on CO2 
Capture, EOR and storage was financed by a grant from the Natural Environmental 
Research Council (NERC) in the period 2005 – 2008.  
 
For 2012 the programme examines the following subjects: 
 
a) The Economics of CO2 EOR Based on an Onshore Hub at St Fergus 
b) Tax Incentives for Facilitating New Field Developments 
c) Tax Incentives for Incremental Investments in PRT-Paying Fields 
d) Tax Relief for Decommissioning 
e) Economics of Further Development of West of Shetland Region 
f) Prospects for Activity Levels in the UKCS after Budget 2012 
ii 
 
g) Economics of Infrastructure and Third Party Tariffing 
 
 
The authors are solely responsible for the work undertaken and views expressed.  The 
sponsors are not committed to any of the opinions emanating from the studies. 
 
Papers are available from: 
  The Secretary (NSO Papers) 
  University of Aberdeen Business School 
  Edward Wright Building 
  Dunbar Street 
  Aberdeen    A24 3QY 
 
  Tel No: (01224) 273427 
  Fax No: (01224) 272181 
  Email:  a.g.kemp@abdn.ac.uk 
 
Recent papers published are: 
 
OP 98 Prospects for Activity Levels in the UKCS to 2030:  the 2005 
Perspective 
By A G Kemp and Linda Stephen (May 2005), pp. 52 
 
 
£20.00 
 
OP 99 A Longitudinal Study of Fallow Dynamics in the UKCS 
By A G Kemp and Sola Kasim, (September 2005), pp. 42 
 
£20.00 
 
OP 100 Options for Exploiting Gas from West of Scotland 
By A G Kemp and Linda Stephen, (December 2005), pp. 70 
 
£20.00 
 
OP 101 Prospects for Activity Levels in the UKCS to 2035 after the 
2006 Budget 
By A G Kemp and Linda Stephen, (April 2006) pp. 61 
 
 
 
£30.00 
OP 102 Developing a Supply Curve for CO2 Capture, Sequestration and 
EOR in the UKCS:  an Optimised Least-Cost Analytical 
Framework 
By A G Kemp and Sola Kasim, (May 2006) pp. 39 
 
 
 
 
£20.00 
OP 103 Financial Liability for Decommissioning in the UKCS: the 
Comparative Effects of LOCs, Surety Bonds and Trust Funds 
By A G Kemp and Linda Stephen, (October 2006) pp. 150 
 
 
£25.00 
 
OP 104 Prospects for UK Oil and Gas Import Dependence 
By A G Kemp and Linda Stephen, (November 2006) pp. 38 
 
£25.00    
OP 105 Long-term Option Contracts for CO2 Emissions 
By A G Kemp and J Swierzbinski, (April 2007) pp. 24 
 
£25.00 
 
iii 
 
OP 106 The Prospects for Activity in the UKCS to 2035:  the 2007 
Perspective 
By A G Kemp and Linda Stephen (July 2007) pp.56 
 
 
£25.00 
 
OP 107 A Least-cost Optimisation Model for CO2 capture 
By A G Kemp and Sola Kasim (August 2007) pp.65  
 
 
£25.00 
OP 108 The Long Term Structure of the Taxation System for the UK 
Continental Shelf 
By A G Kemp and Linda Stephen (October 2007) pp.116 
 
 
£25.00 
OP 109 The Prospects for Activity in the UKCS to 2035: the 2008 
Perspective 
By A G Kemp and Linda Stephen (October 2008) pp.67 
 
 
£25.00 
OP 110 The Economics of PRT Redetermination for Incremental 
Projects in the UKCS  
By A G Kemp and Linda Stephen (November 2008) pp. 56 
 
£25.00 
OP 111 Incentivising Investment in the UKCS: a Response to 
Supporting Investment: a Consultation on the North Sea Fiscal 
Regime 
By A G Kemp and Linda Stephen (February 2009) pp.93 
 
£25.00 
OP 112 A Futuristic Least-cost Optimisation Model of CO2 
Transportation and Storage in the UK/ UK Continental Shelf 
By A G Kemp and Sola Kasim (March 2009) pp.53 
 
£25.00 
OP 113 The Budget 2009 Tax Proposals and Activity in the UK 
Continental Shelf (UKCS) 
By A G Kemp and Linda Stephen (June 2009) pp. 48 
 
£25.00 
OP 114 The Prospects for Activity in the UK Continental Shelf to 2040: 
the 2009 Perspective 
By A G Kemp and Linda Stephen (October 2009) pp. 48 
 
£25.00 
OP 115 The Effects of the European Emissions Trading Scheme (EU 
ETS) on Activity in the UK Continental Shelf (UKCS) and CO2 
Leakage 
By A G Kemp and Linda Stephen (April 2010) pp. 117 
 
£25.00 
OP  116 Economic Principles and Determination of Infrastructure Third 
Party Tariffs in the UK Continental Shelf (UKCS) 
By A G Kemp and Euan Phimister (July 2010) pp. 26 
 
OP 117 Taxation and Total Government Take from the UK Continental 
Shelf (UKCS) Following Phase 3 of the European Emissions 
Trading Scheme (EU ETS) 
By A G Kemp and Linda Stephen (August 2010) pp. 168 
 
 
iv 
 
OP 118 An Optimised Illustrative Investment Model of the Economics 
of Integrated Returns from CCS Deployment in the UK/UKCS 
BY A G Kemp and Sola Kasim (December 2010) pp. 67 
 
 
OP 119 The Long Term Prospects for Activity in the UK Continental 
Shelf  
BY A G Kemp and Linda Stephen (December 2010) pp. 48 
 
OP 120 The Effects of Budget 2011 on Activity in the UK Continental 
Shelf 
BY A G Kemp and Linda Stephen (April 2011) pp. 50 
 
OP 121 The Short and Long Term Prospects for Activity in the UK 
Continental Shelf: the 2011 Perspective 
BY A G Kemp and Linda Stephen (August 2011) pp. 61 
 
OP 122 Prospective Decommissioning Activity and Infrastructure 
Availability in the UKCS 
BY A G Kemp and Linda Stephen (October 2011) pp. 80 
 
OP  123 The Economics of CO2-EOR Cluster Developments in the UK 
Central North Sea/Outer Moray Firth 
BY A G Kemp and Sola Kasim (January 2012) pp. 64 
 
OP 124 A Comparative Study of Tax Reliefs for New Developments in 
the UK Continental Shelf after Budget 2012  
BY A G Kemp and Linda Stephen (July 2012) pp. 108 
 
 
 
  
v 
 
A Comparative Study of Tax Reliefs for New Developments 
in the UK Continental Shelf after Budget 2012 
 
Professor Alexander G. Kemp 
And 
Linda Stephen 
Contents                                                                                                Page 
1. Introduction………………………………….…………………….1 
2. Methodology and Data………………………………………….1 
3. The Tax Schemes Examined in the Study…………………………8 
4. Results – (i) New Developments……………………….….13 
A. $70, 40 pence, NPV/I > 0.3 Case……..………………....13 
B. $70, 40 pence, NPV/I > 0.5 Case ………………………34 
C. $90, 60 pence , NPV/I > 0.3 Case ………….……………53 
D. $90, 60 pence, NPV/I > 0.5 Case ……………………….72 
(ii) Incremental  Projects  ……………………………..93 
1. Under the $70, 40 pence price (NPV/I > 0.3 hurdle) …….93 
2. Under the $70, 40 pence price (NPV/I > 0.5 hurdle)…..…95 
3. Under the $90, 60 pence price (NPV/I > 0.3 hurdle)…..…96 
4. Under the $90, 60 pence price (NPV/I > 0.5 hurdle)…..…98 
5. Conclusions ……………………………………………………99 
Appendix ……………………………………………………….105 
 
1 
 
A Comparative Study of Tax Reliefs for New 
Developments in the UK Continental Shelf  
after Budget 2012  
 
Professor Alexander G. Kemp 
and 
Linda Stephen 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The investment environment in the UK Continental Shelf (UKCS) is 
constantly changing.  This reflects the effects of several factors including 
major changes in (1) oil and gas prices (and expectations regarding their 
future behaviour), (2) exploration success rates, (3) investment and 
operating costs, (4) terms and availability of finance, and (5) the tax 
system.  A major increase in taxation took place in Budget 2011 and 
further allowances for new developments were announced in Budget 
2012.  This paper models potential activity levels taking into account 
updated information on all the above factors plus evaluating the effects of 
several other systems of tax relief debated over the past several months.  
The outputs highlighted are production of oil and gas, field investment, 
operating and development expenditures, and numbers of fields whose 
developments are triggered.  The time period considered is 2011 – 2042 
inclusive. 
   
2. Methodology and Data 
The projections of production and expenditures have been made through 
the use of financial simulation modelling, including the use of the Monte 
Carlo technique, informed by a large, recently-updated, field database 
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validated by the relevant operators.  The field database incorporated key, 
best estimate information on production, and investment, operating and 
decommissioning expenditures.  These refer to 350 sanctioned fields, 150 
incremental projects relating to these fields, 41 probable fields, and 28 
possible fields.  These unsanctioned fields are currently being examined 
for development.  An additional database contains 248 fields defined as 
being in the category of technical reserves.  Summary data on reserves 
(oil/gas) and block locations are available for these.  They are not 
currently being examined for development by licensees. 
 
Monte Carlo modelling was employed to estimate the possible numbers 
of new discoveries in the period to 2037.  The modelling incorporated 
assumptions based on recent trends relating to exploration effort, success 
rates, sizes, and types (oil, gas, condensate) of discovery.  A moving 
average of the behaviour of these variables over the past 5 years was 
calculated separately for 6 areas of the UKCS (Southern North Sea 
(SNS), Central North Sea (CNS), Moray Firth (MF), Northern North Sea 
(NNS), West of Shetlands (WOS), and Irish Sea (IS)), and the results 
employed for use in the Monte Carlo analysis.  Because of the very 
limited data for WOS and IS over the period judgemental assumptions on 
success rates and average sizes of discoveries were made for the 
modelling. 
 
It is postulated that the exploration effort depends substantially on a 
combination of (a) the expected success rate, (b) the likely size of 
discovery, and (c) oil/gas prices.  In the present study 2 future oil/gas 
price scenarios were employed as follows: 
  
3 
 
 
Table 1 
Future Oil and Gas Price Scenarios 
 Oil Price (real) 
$/bbl 
Gas Price (real) 
pence/therm 
High 90 60 
Medium 70 40 
 
 
The postulated numbers of annual exploration wells drilled for the whole 
of the UKCS are as follows for 2011, 2030, and 2037: 
 
Table 2 
Exploration Wells Drilled 
 2012 2030 2037 
High 35 28 25 
Medium 30 24 20 
 
The annual numbers are modelled to decline in a broadly linear fashion 
over the period. 
 
It is postulated that success rates depend substantially on a combination 
of (a) recent experience, and (b) size of the effort.  It is further suggested 
that higher effort is associated with more discoveries but with lower 
success rates compared to reduced levels of effort.  This reflects the view 
that low levels of effort will be concentrated on the lowest risk prospects, 
and thus that higher effort involves the acceptance of higher risk.  For the 
UKCS as a whole 2 success rates were postulated as follows with the 
medium one reflecting the average over the past 5 years. 
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Table 3 
Success Rates for UKCS 
Medium effort/Medium success rate           29% 
High effort/Low success rate                       27% 
 
 
It should be noted that success rates have varied considerably across 
sectors of the UKCS. Thus in the CNS and SNS the averages have 
exceeded 30% while in the other sectors they have been well below the 
average for the whole province.  It is assumed that technological progress 
will maintain these success rates over the time period. 
 
The mean sizes of discoveries made in the historic period for each of the 
6 regions were calculated. They are shown in Table 4.  It was then 
assumed that the mean size of discovery would decrease in line with 
recent historic experience.   
Table 4 
Mean Discovery Size MMboe 
SNS 8 
CNS 32 
NNS 40 
MF 15 
WoS 75 
IS 7 
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For purposes of the Monte Carlo modelling of new discoveries the SD 
was set at 50% of the mean value.  In line with historic experience the 
size distribution of discoveries was taken to be lognormal. 
 
Using the above information the Monte Carlo technique was employed to 
project discoveries in the 6 regions to 2036.  For the whole period the 
total numbers of discoveries for the whole of the UKCS were are follows: 
 
 
Table 5 
Total Number of Discoveries to 2037 
High effort/Low success rate                   210 
Medium Effort/Medium Success Rate     193 
 
 
For each region the average development costs (per boe) of fields in the 
probable and possible categories were calculated.  These reflect 
substantial cost inflation over the last few years.  Investment costs per 
boe depend on several factors including not only the absolute costs in 
different operating conditions (such as water depth) but on the size of the 
fields.  For all of the UKCS the average development cost was $17.7 per 
boe with the highest greatly exceeding that.  In the SNS development 
costs were found to average over $13 per boe because of the small size of 
fields.  In the CNS they averaged $19.5 per boe and in the NNS they 
averaged $18.9 per boe with the highest greatly exceeding that. Operating 
costs over the lifetime of the fields were also calculated.  The averages 
were found to be $13.8 per boe for all of the UKCS, $9.7 per boe in the 
SNS, $14.1 per boe in the CNS and $17.1 per boe in the NNS.  Total 
lifetime field costs (including decommissioning but excluding E and A 
costs) were found to average $33.3 per boe for all of the UKCS, $24.45 
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per boe in the SNS, $35.7 per boe in the CNS, and $37.8 per boe in the 
NNS. 
Using these as the mean values the Monte Carlo technique was employed 
to calculate the development costs of new discoveries.  A normal 
distribution with a SD = 20% of the mean value was employed.  For new 
discoveries annual operating costs were modelled as a percentage of 
accumulated development costs.  This percentage varied according to 
field size.  It was taken to increase as the size of the field was reduced 
reflecting the presence of economies of scale. Thus the field lifetime costs 
in small fields could become very high on a per boe basis. 
 
With respect to fields in the category of technical reserves it was 
recognised that many present major challenges, and so the mean 
development costs in each of the basins was set at $5/boe higher than the 
mean for the new discoveries in that basin. Thus for the CNS the mean 
development costs are over $24.5 per boe and in NNS over $23.8 per boe.  
The distribution of these costs was assumed to be normal with a SD = 
20% of the mean value.  A binomial distribution was employed to find 
the order of new developments. 
 
The annual numbers of new field developments were assumed to be 
constrained by the physical and financial capacity of the industry.  The 
ceilings were assumed to be linked to the oil/gas price scenarios with 
maxima of 20 and 17 respectively for High and Medium price cases.  
These constraints do not apply to incremental projects which are 
additional to new field developments. 
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There is a wide range in the development and operating costs of the set of 
incremental projects currently being examined for development.  For all 
of the UKCS the mean development costs are $15.8 per boe but the 
highest is over $79 per boe.  In the SNS the average development costs 
are $9.3 per boe, but in the NNS it is $21.8 per boe.  While operating 
costs are often relatively low and average $6.84 per boe across all of the 
UKCS, they are very high in a number of cases, with examples in the $50 
- $77 per boe range over their lifetime. 
  
With respect to investment decision making and project screening criteria 
oil companies (even medium-sized and smaller ones) currently assess 
their opportunities in the UKCS in comparison to those available in other 
parts of the world. Capital is allocated on this basis with the UKCS 
having to compete for funds against the opportunities in other provinces. 
A problem with the growing maturity of the UKCS is the relatively small 
average field size and the high unit costs. Recent mean discovery sizes 
are shown in Table 4, but, given the lognormal distribution, the most 
likely sizes are below these averages.  It follows that the materiality of 
returns, expressed in terms of net present values (NPVs), is quite low in 
relation to those in prospect in other provinces (such as offshore Angola, 
or Brazil, for example). Oil companies frequently rank investment 
projects according to the NPV/I ratio. Accordingly, this screening method 
has been adopted in the present study. Specifically, the numerator is the 
post-tax NPV at 10% discount rate in real terms and the denominator is 
pre-tax field investment at 10% discount rate in real terms. This differs 
from the textbook version which states that I should be in post-tax terms 
because the expenditures are tax deductible through allowances. Oil 
companies maintain that they allocate capital funds on a pre-tax basis, 
and this is employed here as the purpose is to reflect realistically the 
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decision-making process. The development project goes ahead when the 
NPV/I ratio as defined above is ≥ 0.3 in one scenario and ≥ 0.5 in a 
second scenario.  The 10% real discount rate reflects the weighted 
average cost of capital to the investor.  The modelling has been 
undertaken under the current tax system.   
 
In the light of experience over the past few years some rephasing of the 
timing of the commencement dates of new field developments and 
incremental projects from those projected by operators was undertaken 
relating to the probability that the project would go ahead.  Where the 
operator indicated that a new field development had a probability ≥ 80% 
of going ahead the date was left unchanged.  Where the probability ≥ 
60% < 80% the commencement date was slipped by 1 year.  Where the 
probability ≥ 40% < 60% the date was slipped by 2 years.  Where the 
probability was ≥ 20% < 40% the date was slipped by 3 years, and where 
the probability was < 20% it was slipped by 4 years.  If an incremental 
project had a probability of proceeding ≥ 50% the date was retained but 
where it was < 50% it was slipped by 1 year. 
 
3. The Tax Schemes Examined in the Study 
A substantial number of tax schemes were examined in the study.  All 
were compared to a base case of Corporation Tax (CT) only with capital 
allowances currently in place.  Scheme 1 incorporates CT at 30% plus 
Supplementary Charge (SC) at 20% without any extra field allowances.  
Scheme 2 incorporates CT at 30% plus SC at 32% without extra field 
allowances.  Scheme 3 incorporates CT at 30%, SC at 32% plus the field 
allowances after Finance Act 2011.  Scheme 4 is the same as Scheme 3 
except that the field allowances are given, irrespective of the SC position 
on the new field in question, against other North Sea income. 
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Scheme 5 incorporates CT at 30% and SC at 32% with a targeted 
investment tax credit which depends on the level of development costs 
rather than field characteristics.  The credit is based on the development 
cost per barrel and the size of the initial reserves in fields.  Low cost per 
barrel fields receive no credit and very high cost per barrel fields have a 
credit cap.  The credit does depend on field characteristics to some extent 
as separate factors are calculated for oil, gas, new fields and incremental 
projects.  Specifically, in the study new oil fields with development costs 
of less than $17.5/bbl receive no credit and new oil fields with 
development costs of $35/bbl or more have a cap.  For new oil fields with 
development costs between $17.5/bbl and $35/bbl the credit factor is 
calculated base on the development cost per barrel above $17.5 with the 
linear slope of the line (or credit factor) determining the size of the credit 
being 0.03.  It reaches a peak of 38 cents per dollar per barrel of 
development costs when the latter reach $35 per barrel. 
 
New gas fields with development costs of less than $10.5/boe receive no 
tax credit and those with development costs of $21/boe or more have a 
credit cap.  For new gas fields with development costs between $10.5/boe 
and $21/boe the credit factor is based on the development cost per barrel 
above $10.5.  The linear slope of the line is 0.03 and reaches a peak of 38 
cents per dollar of development costs per barrel when they reach $21/boe.  
When ($devex/boe minus $10.5) times 0.03) times $devex/boe minus 
$10.5) becomes greater than $21 the credit factor becomes 0.38.  This 
factor is then multiplied by $devex/boe, then converted to £s, and 
multiplied by reserves to give the total allowance/credit which is spread 
over 5 years. 
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For a new field containing both oil and gas the allowance given depends 
on the proportions of oil and gas in total recoverable reserves. 
 
For incremental oil projects not paying PRT the calculations are as for 
new fields but the credit is capped at $40 per dollar of development costs 
per boe (rather than $35 for oil and $24 for gas).  For PRT-paying 
incremental projects the oil project threshold is $11.375/bbl (rather than 
$17.5/bbl) and the cap is $17.5 bbl with the peak credit being $0.19 
(rather than $0.38).  For PRT-paying incremental gas projects the 
threshold is $7/bbl (rather than $10.5/bbl) and the cap is $14/bbl with the 
peak credit being at $0.19.  For incremental projects containing oil and 
gas the allowance given depends on the proportions of oil and gas in the 
reserves.  Scheme 5 is the only one which treats oil and gas differently 
and is also the only scheme examined which gives allowances for 
incremental projects. 
 
More formally the details are as follows: 
For Oil Fields 
If $Devex/boe > $17.5 credit is: 
((($Devex/boe - $17.5) 0.03)*($Devex/boe)) / exchange rate) * boe) 
spread over 5 years 
 
If $Devex/boe - $17.5 > $35 credit is: 
(0.38)*($Devex/boe)) / exchange rate * boe spread over 5 years 
 
For Gas Fields 
If $Devex/boe > $10.5 credit is: 
((($Devex/boe - $10.5) 0.03)*($Devex/boe) / exchange rate* boe) spread 
over 5 years 
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If $Devex/boe - $10.5 > $21 credit is: 
((0.38)*($Devex/boe) / exchange rate * boe) spread over 5 years 
The credit given is proportional to the reserves of oil and gas. 
 
 
For Incremental Projects 
For non-PRT fields the oil credit is:  
If $Devex/boe > $17.5 credit is 
((($Devex/boe - $17.5) 0.03)*($Devex/boe)) / exchange rate) * boe) 
spread over 5 years 
 
If $Devex/boe - $17.5 > $40 credit is 
(0.38)*($Devex/boe)) / exchange rate * boe spread over 5 years 
 
For Gas fields  
If $Devex/boe > $10.5 credit is 
((($Devex/boe - $10.5) 0.03)*($Devex/boe) / exchange rate * boe) spread 
over 5 years 
 
If $Devex/boe - $10.5 > $24 credit is 
((0.38)*($Devex/boe) / exchange rate * boe) spread over 5 years 
The credit given is proportional to the reserves of oil and gas. 
 
For PRT paying fields the oil credit is: 
If $Devex/boe > $11.375 credit is 
((($Devex/boe - $11.375) 0.03)*($Devex/boe)) / exchange rate) * boe) 
spread over 5 years 
 
12 
 
If $Devex/boe - $11.375 > $17.5-11.375 credit is 
(0.19)*($Devex/boe)) / exchange rate * boe spread over 5 years 
 
For Gas fields 
If $Devex/boe > $7 credit is 
((($Devex/boe - $7) 0.03)*($Devex/boe) / exchange rate * boe) spread 
over 5 years 
If $Devex/boe - $7 > $14 credit is 
((0.19)*($Devex/boe) / exchange rate * boe) spread over 5 years 
The credit given is proportional to the reserves of oil and gas. 
 
Scheme 6 incorporates the greater of the value of the benefits to the 
investor of the allowances as in Finance Act 2011 and those under the tax 
credit arrangement of Scheme 5. 
 
Scheme 7 – CT at 30% + SCT at 32% and SCT allowance (not credit):  
 
Scheme 7 incorporates a variable field allowance (not credit) which 
depends on reserves and development cost per barrel.  For fields with 
development costs per barrel above a floor value a linearly increasing 
allowance is applied until a specified ceiling development cost per barrel 
is reached after which the allowance is constant. 
 
Thus Scheme 7 uses a floor of $19 (£11.61) and a ceiling of $35 (£21.39) 
and a scale factor slope of 1/12.  Thus the formula for a field with 
development costs > $19 is (((($Devex/boe) - $19)) /12)*(mmboe/100) * 
1000)) / exchange rate spread over a minimum of 5 years.  The allowance 
is taken when the field has SCT against which the allowance can be set.  
If the development cost per barrel is greater than $35 the formula 
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becomes (((($Devex/boe) - $19)) /12)*(mmboe/100) * 1000)) / exchange 
rate spread over a minimum of 5 years. 
 
Scheme 8 – CT at 30% + SCT at 32% and SCT allowance (not credit) 
Scheme 8 is as Scheme 7 but the ceiling is higher.  The Scheme 8 ceiling 
is $58.895 i.e. £36 per boe. 
 
Allowance is as follows: 
If $Devex/boe > $58.896 field allowance is 
(((($58.896 - $19) / 12)*(mmboe/100) * 1000) / exchange rate spread 
over a minimum of 5 years and taken when the field has SCT revenue. 
 
If $Devex/boe > $19 field allowance is 
(((($Devex/boe) - $19)) / 12)*(mmboe/100)* 1000)) / exchange rate 
spread over a minimum of 5 years. 
 
Scheme 9 
Scheme 9 incorporates CT at 30% plus SC at 32% with the allowances as 
in Budget 2012. 
 
4. Results – New Developments 
A. $70, 40 pence, NPV/I > 0.3 Case 
As discussed above the consequences of the 9 tax schemes examined are 
all related to the base case where there is CT only.  While CT and SC do 
impact on incremental projects, in this set of results the allowances for 
incremental projects in Schemes 5 and 6 are excluded in order that the 
effects of schemes 3 – 9 can be directly compared.  Schemes 1 and 2 
automatically impact on incremental projects and these effects are 
included in this section.  Also, only incremental projects currently being 
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examined by the industry are included.  Under the $70, 40 pence price 
and NPV/I > 0.3 scenario over the period there are 660 fields and projects 
which could potentially go ahead.  Of these 428 passed on a pre-tax basis 
and 385 passed on a CT only basis.  All the schemes resulted in a lower 
number of field developments compared to the CT only cases.  Scheme 1 
produced 66 less developments, Scheme 2 128 less, Scheme 3 66 less, 
Scheme 4 53 less, Scheme 5 58 less, Scheme 6 30 less, Schemes 7 and 8 
122 less and Scheme 9 (Budget 2012) 39 less.  In Chart 1 the changes to 
the numbers of fields in production over the period to 2042 are shown.  In 
Chart 2 the cumulative change in the numbers of fields passing the 
economic hurdle over the period are shown. 
Chart 1 
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Chart 2 
 
 
It is seen that the composite Scheme 6 has the strongest effect in 
maintaining the numbers of field developments of all the schemes 
examined.  It is noteworthy that for some years this scheme actually 
increases the numbers of developments.  It should be emphasised that the 
increase in the numbers compared to the CT only case results from the 
field allowances already in place before Budget 2012.  With Scheme 5 
the numbers of field developments are always less than under the CT only 
scheme.  The results also clearly indicate that Scheme 2 produces a 
substantial decrease in the numbers of new field developments.  The 
results indicate that Schemes 7 and 8 are not widely effective in 
enhancing the numbers of new field developments.  The schemes are not 
well-targeted on substantial numbers of marginal fields. 
 
It is also noteworthy from the results that Scheme 9 (the Budget 2012 
proposals) is generally effective in enhancing the numbers of new field 
developments compared to most of other schemes.  Only the composite 
Scheme 6 produces more new developments over the thirty-year period.  
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But the loss of production is considerably less with Scheme 1 compared 
to Scheme 9.  The automatic help given to incremental projects with 
Scheme 1 is relevant here.  Budget 2012 incentivises a very considerable 
number of small field developments, but does not help marginal fields 
whose sizes exceed the qualifying limits.  The higher rate of SC (32%) 
impacts adversely on these fields, and the net result is that overall 
production over the period is greater with Schemes 1, 5 and 6 compared 
to Scheme 9. 
 
The changes to oil production over the period under the different schemes 
are shown in Chart 3.  The long term effectiveness of Scheme 1 is 
highlighted followed by Schemes 5 and 6.  The results for natural gas are 
shown in Chart 4.  While Scheme 1 again performs best the difference 
between it and Scheme 9, the second most effective one, is not nearly so 
marked.  Perhaps surprisingly Schemes 5 and 6 are not especially 
effective in curtailing the loss of production compared to Scheme 1.  It 
should be noted that Scheme 1 automatically applies to incremental 
projects while no corresponding help arises with the other schemes. 
Chart 3 
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Chart 4 
 
 
In Charts 5 and 6 the annual and cumulative changes in total hydrocarbon 
production over the period are shown.  Unsurprisingly, Scheme 1 
produces the most effective performance, with a cumulative loss of 
production of around 1.65 billion boe (bn boe) compared to the CT only 
case in the period to 2042.  The automatic help given to incremental 
projects by Scheme 1 compared to the other schemes is a causal factor in 
the comparative results.  With Scheme 9 there is a cumulative loss of 3.8 
bn boe.  Under Schemes 7 and 8 there is a loss of 4.68 bn boe.  With the 
composite Scheme 6 the loss is 2.9 bn boe and with Scheme 2 it is 4.7 bn 
boe. 
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Chart 5 
 
 
Chart 6 
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In Chart 7 the changes to field development expenditures are shown over 
the period.  Unsurprisingly, Scheme 1 is most effective in preserving the 
development effort.  The composite Scheme 6 is the next most effective.  
With Scheme 9 there is a considerable reduction in the development 
effort over the next few years but in the later stages of the period this 
scheme is relatively effective.  The explanation is that, over the next 
decade there is a number of potential but marginal developments whose 
size is above the qualifying limits established in Budget 2012.  But, in the 
later years of the study period the sizes of fields are more likely to come 
under the qualifying limits for the new field allowances. 
 
Chart 7 
 
In Chart 8 the changes to cumulative development expenditures are 
shown.  With Scheme 1 the cumulative reduction is £21 billion.  With the 
most ineffective schemes the cumulative reduction is around £56 billion.  
With Scheme 9 the cumulative reduction is around £46 billion. 
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Chart 8 
 
 
In Chart 9 the cumulative changes to operating expenditures are shown.  
Under Scheme 1 the cumulative reduction is £15 billion over the period.  
With the most ineffective schemes the cumulative reduction is around 
£40 billion.  Under Scheme 9 the cumulative reduction to 2042 is just 
over £30 billion. 
Chart 9 
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In Chart 10 the changes to total tax revenues over the period are shown 
on a yearly basis and in Chart 11 they are shown on a cumulative basis.  
There is a substantial increase in tax revenues compared to the CT only 
case under all the schemes.  Schemes 5 and 6 produce the largest 
cumulative increase which is in the £75 - £76 billion range.  With 
Scheme 9 the cumulative increase is around £65 billion.  Scheme 1 
produces the lowest cumulative increase of £58 billion.  With respect to 
timing it is noteworthy that Scheme 9 produces relatively large short-
term increases in revenues but is relatively less effective in later years.  
The opposite is the case with Schemes 5 and6 which produce relatively 
large increases in the longer term.  The issue is the familiar one of 
increasing the tax take on fields which will still go ahead with the 
increased tax rate, but which could reduce the number of new 
developments, and incentivising more developments (which involves the 
utilisation of more capital allowances and thus less early tax revenues) 
and the receipt of larger tax revenues in the longer term. 
Chart 10 
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Chart 11 
 
In Charts 12 and 13 the changes to CT and SC are shown annually under 
the different schemes while in Charts 14 and 15 they are shown 
cumulatively.  Over the long term CT revenues stay up best under 
Scheme 1 with a cumulative reduction of only just over £6 billion.  With 
Scheme 9 there is a cumulative loss of £20 billion.  With Schemes 5 and 
6 there is a cumulative loss of just over £15 billion.  Scheme 1 performs 
best because it produces the largest volume of production (and thus 
taxable income). 
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Chart 12 
 
 
 
 
Chart 13 
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Chart 14 
 
 
 
 
Chart 15 
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In order to obtain a better understanding of the operation of the various 
schemes the percentage tax takes were calculated over the lifetime of the 
fields in question.  The tax takes are defined as the percentage of the real 
pre-tax cash flow taken in tax payments. 
 
The results are shown for Scheme 1 in Chart 16.  This is a very straight-
forward case where the take is 50% in all cases.  (Investors are assumed 
to be in a tax-paying position). 
Chart 16 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The tax takes under Scheme 2 are shown in Chart 17.  The general rate is 
62% and there are no field allowances.  The tax takes are mostly at or 
near 62%.  The restriction on decommissioning relief for SC increases the 
effective rate to a modest extent. 
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Chart 17 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In Chart 18 the tax takes are shown under Scheme 3 which incorporates 
the field allowances at the time of Budget 2011.  While many of the fields 
pay tax at or around 62% the field allowances reduce the effective rate 
considerably in a substantial number of cases.  In some cases the effective 
rate falls below 30%.  This can come about on small fields where the 
field allowance greatly reduced the liability to SC on production income 
but relief continues to be given for the field investment at 62%.  Further 
insights into the behaviour of Scheme 3 are shown in Chart 19 which 
shows the tax takes on fields whose development is triggered by the 
allowances compared to the situation with SC at 32% but no field 
allowances.  It is seen that the allowances produce tax takes often in the 
20%-55% range. 
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Chart 18 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chart 19 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Real Tax Take Scheme 3
$70/bbl and 40p/therm
Hurdle : Real NPV at 10% / Real Devex at 10% > 0.3
0.00
0.10
0.20
0.30
0.40
0.50
0.60
0.70
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Real NPV @ 10% / Pre-tax Devex at 10%
Real Tax take
Probable Possible Technical Reserves New Exploration
 
Real Tax Take Triggered by Scheme 3 Allowances
$70/bbl and 40p/therm
Hurdle : Real NPV at 10% / Real Devex at 10% > 0.3
0.00
0.10
0.20
0.30
0.40
0.50
0.60
0.70
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7
Real NPV @ 10% / Pre-tax Devex at 10%
Real Tax take
Probable Possible Technical Reserves New Exploration
28 
 
The results for Scheme 4 are shown in Chart 20.  There are now more 
cases where the take falls to relatively low levels.  It will be recalled that 
this scheme permits the field allowances for a new field to be set against 
other field income irrespective of whether there is adequate income on 
the new field to absorb these allowances.  Chart 21 shows that tax takes 
on fields which are triggered by this allowance can result in some low 
effective rates of tax. 
Chart 20 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chart 21 
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In Chart 22 the results are shown for Scheme 5.  It is seen that the rate for 
many fields is 62%, but for a substantial proportion it is 30%.  There are 
very few outlier results with this scheme.  In Chart 23 the tax takes are 
shown in the fields triggered by the allowance (compared to SC at 32% 
and no allowance).  Most of the takes are in the 35%-60% range with 
very few outliers.   
Chart 22 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chart 23 
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In Chart 24 the results are shown for Scheme 6.  It will be recalled that 
this is a composite of Schemes 5 and 4 with the investor being able to 
choose his preferred scheme.  It is seen that when profitability is low the 
tax take is sometimes reduced compared to Scheme 5.  The occasions 
when the take becomes less than 30% are due to the Scheme 4 allowance.  
In Chart 25 the tax takes are shown on the fields whose development is 
triggered as a consequence of the allowance (compared with SC at 32% 
and no allowance).  The takes are in the 20%-60% range for the great 
majority of fields. 
 
Chart 24 
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Chart 25 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In Charts 26 and 27 the tax takes under Schemes 7 and 8 are shown.  In 
the majority of cases the take is around 62%.  In only a few cases does 
the take come significantly below 60%, even at low levels of profitability.   
Chart 26 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Real Tax Take Triggered by Scheme 6 Allowances
$70/bbl and 40p/therm
Hurdle : Real NPV at 10% / Real Devex at 10% > 0.3
-1.00
-0.80
-0.60
-0.40
-0.20
0.00
0.20
0.40
0.60
0.80
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7
Real NPV @ 10% / Pre-tax Devex at 10%
Real Tax take
Probable Possible Technical Reserves New Exploration
 
Real Tax Take Scheme 7
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Chart 27 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In Chart 28 the tax takes under Scheme 9 are shown.  There is a big 
spread in the effective rates.  The lower rates are sometimes, but not 
always, geared to situations of low profitability.  This results from the 
reliance on physical factors to determine the availability and size of the 
allowance.  In Chart 29 the tax takes are shown for the fields whose 
development has been triggered by the allowance (compared to SC at 
32% and no field allowance).  There is a wide spread of effective rates 
from around 60% to less than 20%. 
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Chart 28 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chart 29 
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B. $70, 40 pence, NPV/I > 0.5 Case 
In Chart 30 the changes in the annual numbers of fields in production 
are shown for the situation where the economic hurdle is NPV/I > 0.5.  
The figures are shown for the cumulative reduction in the numbers of 
fields passing the hurdle in Chart 31.Over the period there are 660 
potential new developments in this scenario.  Of these 300 fail the 
economic hurdle pre-tax, and 282 pass the hurdle after CT.  Compared 
to this base case of CT only there are 67 less developments with 
Scheme 1, 114 less with Scheme 2, 76 less with Scheme 3 (the 2011 
system), 106 less with Scheme 5, 72 less with Scheme 6, 114 less 
with Scheme 7, and 54 less with Scheme 9.  Thus Scheme 9 (Budget 
2012) produces the smallest reduction in numbers of producing fields 
over the total period.  Scheme 5 is seen to perform relatively 
ineffectively as do Schemes 2, 7 and 8.  The ineffective performance 
of Scheme 5 is at first sight more surprising and the reasons are 
discussed below when the tax takes are exhibited. 
Chart 30 
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Chart 31 
 
 
In Charts 32, 33 and 34 the changes in annual oil, gas, and total 
hydrocarbon production respectively are shown under the various 
schemes.   
 
Chart 32 
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Chart 33 
 
 
Chart 34 
 
 
The cumulative changes in oil and total hydrocarbon production are 
shown in Charts 35 and 36.  The lowest cumulative reduction 
compared to the CT only case is with Scheme 1 at 1.9 bn boe.  The 
next best performer from this viewpoint is Scheme 9 where the 
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cumulative reduction is 2.2 bn boe.  The composite Scheme 6 
produces the next best performance with a reduction of 2.5 bn boe.  
Schemes 3 and 4 result in cumulative reductions exceeding 2.5 bn 
boe and Schemes 2, 7 and 8 result in reductions exceeding 2.8 bn boe.  
Scheme 1 produces the lowest reduction in part because there is some 
automatic protection for incremental projects compared to the other 
schemes shown.  The explanations for the comparative performance of 
these other schemes are discussed below when the tax takes are 
shown.  Scheme 9 (Budget 2012) is most effective in preventing the 
numbers from falling significantly.  Scheme 4 is generally the second 
best performer in this respect.  Schemes 5, 7 and 8 do not perform 
well from this viewpoint. 
Chart 35 
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Chart 36 
 
 
In Chart 37 the changes in new field development costs annually are 
shown.  Scheme 1 generally performs best, followed by Scheme 9.  
The results for cumulative development expenditures, shown in Chart 
38 indicate that with Scheme 1 cumulative development costs are 
reduced by £23 billion while with Scheme 9 they are reduced by £27 
billion. 
Chart 37 
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Chart 38 
 
 
In Chart 39 the annual changes to operating costs are shown over the 
period.  Unsurprisingly, Scheme 1 performs best with Scheme 9 in 
second place.  In Chart 40 the cumulative changes to operating costs 
are shown.  With Scheme 1 they fall by £14 billion while with 
Scheme 9 they fall by £16.5 billion. 
Chart 39 
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Chart 40 
 
In Chart 41 the annual change in total tax payments are shown.  The 
corresponding cumulative amounts are shown in Chart 42. It is seen 
that Scheme 1 produces significantly less extra tax than other 
schemes, though the absolute extra amount accumulates to nearly £42 
billion over the period.  There is very little difference among the 
cumulative extra tax receipts with the other schemes.  Scheme 9 
produces extra revenues of £65 billion over the period. 
Chart 41 
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Chart 42 
 
 
In Charts 43 and 44 the annual changes to CT and SC are shown under 
the various schemes.  The reduction in CT is least with Scheme 1, 
with Scheme 9 generally being second in this respect.  With SC the 
smallest increase is clearly with Scheme 1.  The increases across all 
the other schemes are quite similar.  The results for CT can be seen 
more clearly from Chart 45 which show the cumulative reductions.  
These amount to nearly £9 billion with Scheme 1 and £11.5 billion 
with Scheme 9.  On the other hand, in Chart 46 it is seen that the 
cumulative increase in SC is just over £50 billion with Scheme 1 and 
£78 billion with Scheme 9. 
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Chart 43 
 
 
 
 
Chart 44 
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Chart 45 
 
 
 
Chart 46 
 
 
In Chart 47 the real (percentage) tax takes under Scheme 1 are shown.  
They are at the flat-rate of 50%.  In Chart 48 the takes under Scheme 
2 are shown.  While in many cases the rate is 62% in a very 
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substantial number it exceeds that, reflecting the reduced relief for 
decommissioning in relation to the headline tax rate. 
Chart 47 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chart 48 
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In Chart 49 the tax takes under Scheme 3 are shown.  While some 
fields face the 62% rate a high proportion pay at a lower rate reflecting 
the field allowances in force in 2011.  Very considerable numbers now 
pay at effective rates below 50%, with some facing rates of 30% and 
less.  The availability of relief on investment at 62% while obtaining 
substantial relief from SC on production income from the field 
allowances accounts for the lower rate.  The latter relief is not directly 
targeted on profitability as the allowances relate to physical factors. 
Chart 49 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Further insights into the operation of Scheme 3 are shown in Chart 50 
which shows the tax takes on developments triggered by the 
allowances compared to the situation with no field allowances.  It is 
seen that effective rates range from 20% to nearly 60% in cases of 
moderate profitability.  There is no clear relationship with field 
profitability. 
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Chart 50 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In Chart 51 the tax takes under Scheme 4 are shown.  Being able to 
obtain investment relief against other field income at 62% irrespective 
of the position of the new field in question can mean that effective tax 
rates are low in some cases.  But many fields continue to pay at 
effective rates in excess of 50%.  Further insights into the operation of 
Scheme 4 are shown in Chart 52 which shows the effective tax rates 
on developments triggered by the scheme.  The majority of the rates 
are in the 20%-60% range with some at even lower rates.  The system 
is not progressive in relation to field profitability. 
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Chart 51 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chart 52 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The tax takes under Scheme 5 are shown in Chart 53.  Many fields 
continue to pay at an effective rate of around 62% but a considerable 
number face rates between 30% and 40%.  The apparent discontinuity 
in the rates payable reflects the slope of the scale factor determining 
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the rate of relief with the development costs per barrel.  This scheme 
does not produce very low rates of tax as was evident with Schemes 3 
and 4.  Sub-economic fields are not generally helped with Scheme 5, 
while with Scheme 3 this could happen. 
Chart 53 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chart 54 
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Further insights into the operation of Scheme 5 are shown in Chart 54 
which shows the tax rates on developments triggered by the scheme.  
It is seen that the great majority of the takes are in the range 30%-40% 
with relatively few around 60%. 
Chart 55 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chart 56 
  
 
Real Tax Take Scheme 6
$70/bbl and 40p/therm
Hurdle : Real NPV at 10% / Real Devex at 10% > 0.5
0.00
0.10
0.20
0.30
0.40
0.50
0.60
0.70
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Real NPV @ 10% / Pre-tax Devex at 10%
Real Tax take
Probable Possible Technical Reserves New Exploration
 
Real Tax Take Triggered by Scheme 6 Allowances
$70/bbl and 40p/therm
Hurdle : Real NPV at 10% / Real Devex at 10% > 0.5
0.00
0.10
0.20
0.30
0.40
0.50
0.60
0.70
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2
Real NPV @ 10% / Pre-tax Devex at 10%
Real Tax take
Probable Possible Technical Reserves New Exploration
50 
 
In Chart 55 the tax takes under the composite Scheme 6 are shown.  
Rather more of the fields now face rates below 62%.  The field 
allowances current in 2011 (Scheme 3) helped some fields to a greater 
extent than Scheme 5.  Examples include small fields which are not 
very capital intensive but which have relatively high operating costs.  
This feature is highlighted in Chart 56 which shows the effective tax 
rates on developments triggered by Scheme 6. 
 
In Chart 57 the tax takes under Scheme 7 are shown.  They are 
generally at 62% or higher and so are ineffective as a general scheme.  
The same finding applies to Scheme 8 (Chart 58). 
 
Chart 57 
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Chart 58 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The tax takes under Scheme 9 are shown in Chart 59.  There is a wide 
spread of tax takes.  Not many pay at the full rate of 62%.  A 
significant number pay at 30% or less.  The availability of investment 
relief at 62% while paying tax on production income at rates well 
below this level explains the results.  In small fields the enhanced field 
allowances can greatly reduce liability to the SC.  In Chart 60 the tax 
takes are shown on developments triggered by Scheme 9.  There is a 
very wide range from 10%-60% with no clear relationship to field 
profitability. 
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Chart 59 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chart 60 
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C. $90, 60 pence, NPV/I > 0.3 Case 
Under the $90, 60 pence price and NPV/I > 0.3 investment hurdle 
there are 677 new fields and incremental projects of which 78 fail the 
economic hurdle before tax.  There are 574 fields and projects which 
pass the hurdle after CT.  Compared to the CT only case it was found 
that, over the period to 2042, there were 36 less developments with 
Scheme 1, 76 less with Scheme 2, 34 less with Scheme 3, 12 extra 
with Scheme 5, 13 extra with Scheme 6, 65 less with Schemes 7 and 
8, and 17 less with Scheme 9.  
 
In Chart 61 the changes in the numbers of fields in production 
compared to the CT only case are shown on an annual basis.  In Chart 
62 the numbers of new developments passing the hurdle are shown on 
cumulative basis.  Schemes 5 and 6 produce an increase in the 
number of producing fields.  The ability to obtain the benefit of the 
field allowance against other field income plus the extra help given to 
gas fields are key explanations of the results.  It is seen that Scheme 9 
(Budget 2012) performs next best in terms of maintaining the numbers 
of producing fields, reflecting the effective operation of the field 
allowances.  Unsurprisingly, Scheme 2, with no field allowances, 
performs least well.  Schemes 7 and 8 are also fairly ineffective as the 
allowance does not protect many smaller fields from the SC. 
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Chart 61 
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In Charts 63, 64 and 65 the annual changes to oil, gas and total 
hydrocarbon production respectively are shown under the different 
schemes.   
Chart 63 
 
 
Chart 64 
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Chart 65 
 
 
In Chart 66 the cumulative changes to total hydrocarbon production 
over the whole period are shown.  Schemes 5 and 6 result in small 
increases in production, cumulating to 0.4 bn boe over the period.  The 
ability to receive tax relief against other income and the extra help 
given to gas developments are causal factors.  Scheme 1 is the next 
best performing scheme with a cumulative reduction of 0.7 bn boe.  
Scheme 9 (Budget 2012) also performs relatively well with a 
cumulative reduction of 0.8 bn boe.  Scheme 2 is the worst performer 
with a cumulative reduction of 1.7 bn boe.  Scheme 4 results in a 
cumulative reduction of 1.1 bn boe.  Schemes 7 and 8 are not very 
effective.  The allowance does not help many marginal fields. 
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Chart 66 
 
 
In Charts 67 and 68 the annual and cumulative changes in field 
development expenditures from the base case are shown with the 9 
schemes.  Schemes 5 and 6 produce positive results, particularly over 
the next decade.  A combination of the rates of relief, their allowance 
against other field income, and the special provisions for gas produce 
the effects shown.  Scheme 9, while showing a clear reduction 
compared to the base case, performs better than several of the other 
schemes.  Scheme 2 produces the largest decline in investment. 
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Chart 67 
 
 
 
Chart 68 
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In Charts 69 and 70 the annual and cumulative changes to operating 
costs are shown.  Again, Schemes 5 and 6 produce significant 
positive results over the base case reflecting the higher development 
activity with these schemes.  Scheme 9 produces the next best 
performance in terms of activity levels.  Scheme 2 clearly exhibits the 
largest reduction. 
 
Chart 69 
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Chart 70 
 
 
In Charts 71 and 72 the annual and cumulative changes to total tax 
revenues compared to the base case are shown under the various 
schemes.  In the long term Schemes 5 and 6 produce more extra 
revenues than the other schemes, but over the next few years the 
increase is less than with some other schemes, reflecting the higher 
investment expenditure and thus utilisation of allowances.  The 
highest cumulative increase exceeds £190 billion by 2042.  The lowest 
increase in tax revenues is with Scheme 1 which has SC at 20%.  The 
increase in yield still exceeds £120 billion.  The flat-rate scheme does 
produce strong enough incentives to develop modestly-profitable 
projects. 
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Chart 71 
 
 
 
Chart 72 
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In Charts 73 and 74 the annual and cumulative changes in CT are 
shown under the various schemes.  There are modest net increases 
with Schemes 5 and 6 reflecting the higher degree of new activity 
produced by these schemes, through the large effective rate of relief to 
marginal fields and the extra help given to gas fields.  All the other 
schemes produce reductions in CT.  Scheme 9 results in a cumulative 
reduction of £4 billion. 
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Chart 74 
 
In Charts 75 and 76 the annual and cumulative changes in SC are 
shown under the various schemes.  There are very substantial 
increases under all the schemes with no very major differences among 
them, except for Scheme 1 which produces much less revenues than 
the others.  The cumulative total for Scheme 1 is around £125 billion 
while for the others the totals are in the £190-£200 billion range. 
Chart 75 
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Chart 76 
 
In Chart 77 the real percentage tax takes are shown under Scheme 1.  
They are generally at 50% as expected.  In Chart 78 the takes under 
Scheme 2 are shown.  Many are around 62% but in a considerable 
number of cases the rate just exceeds 62%, reflecting the less than full 
relief for decommissioning costs.  The extent of the increase above 
62% depends on the importance of the decommissioning costs. 
Chart 77 
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Chart 78 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chart 79 
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In Chart 79 the tax takes under Scheme 3 are shown.  This shows the 
effect of the field allowances in force in 2011.  There is a very 
noticeable change as a result of these allowances, with effective rates 
in many of the fields being considerably below the marginal rate of 
62%.  This applies to fields in all of the categories shown.  Over the 
period 42 more developments take place compared to the system in 
the absence of the field allowances.  The results where the effective 
tax rate is relatively low refer to cases where the investment relief is at 
62%, but the tax on the new field’s production is relatively limited. 
 
In Chart 80 the tax takes on the developments triggered by Scheme 3 
are shown (compared to no field allowances).  They range from 20% 
to 60% for the majority of cases.  There is no clear relationship with 
profitability. 
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In Chart 81 the tax takes are shown under Scheme 4 where the field 
allowances can be set against income from other fields.  The results 
are broadly similar to those of Scheme 3. 
 
Chart 81 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In Chart 82 the tax takes under Scheme 5 are shown.  Over the period 
there are 88 extra field developments compared to the case with no 
field allowances, and 12 extra compared to the CT only case.  The 
allowance reduces the effective tax rates substantially on fields of 
relatively low profitability.  The lower profitability of gas compared to 
oil fields is also specifically catered for by Scheme 5.  The observed 
results that some fields of relatively low profitability (as measured by 
NPV/I) pay tax at 62% refer to situations where the field operating 
costs are relatively high. 
 
 
 
Real Tax Take Scheme 4
$90/bbl and 60p/therm
Hurdle : Real NPV at 10% / Real Devex at 10% > 0.3
0.00
0.10
0.20
0.30
0.40
0.50
0.60
0.70
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
Real NPV @ 10% / Pre-tax Devex at 10%
Real Tax take
Probable Possible Technical Reserves New Exploration
68 
 
Chart 82 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In Chart 83 the tax takes on developments triggered by Scheme 5 are 
shown.  There is a very wide range of takes with a few being 
extremely low reflecting the use of the allowance against other income 
in cases where the new field income was very small. 
Chart 83 
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The tax takes under Scheme 6 are shown in Chart 84.  They are not 
very different from those of Scheme 5 with only a small extra activity 
over the period.  Some fields are better off with the 2011 allowances 
than with Scheme 5.  These are fields with relatively high operating 
costs. 
 
Chart 84 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The tax takes under Scheme 7 are shown in Chart 85.  Most fields 
continue to pay at 62% rate and there are only 11 extra developments 
compared to the situation with no field allowances (Scheme 2).  While 
Scheme 7 incentivises a few extra developments little or no benefits 
accrue to a large number of smaller fields in particular.  Similar 
observations apply to Scheme 8 (Chart 86). 
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Chart 85 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chart 86 
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In Chart 87 the tax takes under Scheme 9 (Budget 2012) are shown.  
The allowances result in 59 more new field developments being 
incentivised compared to the situation with no field allowances.  There 
are 17 fewer field developments with Scheme 9 compared to the CT 
only cases.  It is seen that a large number of fields face an effective tax 
rate below 62%.  This is exhibited more clearly in Chart 88 which 
shows the tax takes on the fields whose development has been 
triggered by the field allowances in Scheme 9 (compared to no field 
allowances).  The tax takes are not noticeably related in a progressive 
manner to profitability, reflecting the physical rather than economic 
characteristics of the allowances. 
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Chart 88 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
D. $90, 60 pence, NPV/I > 0.5 Case 
Under the $90, 60 pence price scenario with hurdle of NPV/I > 0.5 
there are 677 potential new developments/ projects of which 115 fail 
the hurdle before tax.  After CT there are 519 viable developments. 
 
In Chart 89 the annual changes in the numbers of fields in production 
compared to the base case of CT only are shown, and in Chart 90 the 
cumulative changes to the numbers of fields passing the hurdle are 
shown.  It is seen that Schemes 1 and 6 generally perform best form 
this viewpoint.  Over the period there are 70 less new developments 
with Scheme 6 compared to the CT only case.  Scheme 1 produces 66 
less new developments compared to the CT only case.  The worst 
performing scheme is Scheme 2 which results in 183 less new 
developments.  Schemes 7 and 8 also do not perform well with 169 
less new developments.  Scheme 9 results in 82 less new 
developments compared to CT only case.  Scheme 5 produces 86 less 
developments. 
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Chart 89 
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The annual changes to oil, gas and total hydrocarbon production are 
shown in Charts 91, 92 and 93 respectively.  The best performance 
comes from Scheme 1 for both oil and gas with the reduction in oil 
production being noticeably less compared to the other schemes.  It 
should be noted that the lower rate of SC automatically applies to 
incremental projects.  Schemes 5 and 6 are next best with respect to 
production performance.  All the other schemes have distinctly lower 
achievements for oil.  Scheme 9 performs reasonably well with 
respect to gas.   
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Chart 92 
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The cumulative effects on total hydrocarbon production over the 
period are shown in Chart 94.  It is seen that all schemes result in a 
substantial cumulative reduction compared to the CT only case.  Even 
Scheme 1 results in a reduction of 1.95 bn boe over the period to 
2042.  The worst performer is Scheme 2 which results in a major 
cumulative reduction of 4.8 bn boe.  Scheme 5 produces an overall 
reduction of 2.6 bn boe and Scheme 9 results in a cumulative 
reduction of 3.6 bn boe.  The results under this price and hurdle rate 
case are more dramatic in terms of reduced production compared to 
the $90, 60 pence, NPV/I > 0.3 case, reflecting the importance of the 
hurdle rate employed. 
 
Chart 94 
 
 
 
The changes on development costs are shown in Chart 95 on an 
annual basis and in Chart 96 on a cumulative basis.  The lowest 
cumulative reduction is with Scheme 1 at around £26 billion.  The 
next best performers are Schemes 5 and 6 where the cumulative 
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reduction exceeds £30 billion.  The worst performer is Scheme 2 
where the cumulative reduction exceeds £60 billion.  This last result 
highlights the need for the presence of allowances in an environment 
with the SC at 32%.  Scheme 9 produces a cumulative reduction of 
£46 billion which is a substantial improvement over the scheme 
without field allowances, but well below the performance of Schemes 
1, 5 and 6. 
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Chart 96 
 
 
Charts 97 and 98 show the annual and cumulative reductions in 
operating costs compared to the CT only case.  Schemes 1, 5 and 6 
exhibit the smallest reductions with the cumulative effects being in the 
£18 - £20 billion range.  The biggest reduction is with Scheme 2 with 
a cumulative decline of £46 billion.  Scheme 9 produces a cumulative 
reduction of £32 billion. 
 
  
-70000  
-60000  
-50000  
-40000  
-30000  
-20000  
-10000  
0  
2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 2022 2024 2026 2028 2030 2032 2034 2036 2038 2040 2042 
£m (Real 2011) 
Cumulative Change in Potential Development Costs  
$90/bbl and 60p/therm 
Hurdle : Real NPV @ 10% / Devex @ 10% > 0.5 
Scheme 1 Scheme 2 Scheme 3 
Scheme 4 Scheme 5 Scheme 6 
Scheme 7 Scheme 8 Scheme 9 
79 
 
Chart 97 
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Charts 99 and 100 show the annual and cumulative changes in total 
tax receipts over the period compared to the CT only case.  Schemes 5 
and 6 produce the largest cumulative increase in tax receipts of nearly 
£150 billion.  These schemes are progressive in relation to cost and 
price variations (including the oil/gas price differential) which explain 
the results.  Scheme 1 produces the smallest increase of around £100 
billion.  While there are many new developments under Scheme 1 
there is a loss of tax revenues from the more profitable projects.  
Scheme 9 produces a cumulative increase in tax revenues of around 
£130 billion.  Considerable numbers of new developments are 
triggered, and there are increased revenues from the more profitable 
fields compared to the CT only case. 
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Chart 100 
 
 
Further insights into the tax position are shown in Charts 101 and 102 
which show the annual and cumulative changes in CT.  The lowest fall 
is with Scheme 1 with a cumulative reduction of £12 billion over the 
period.  This reflects the relatively large numbers of new 
developments compared to other schemes.  The second best 
performers are Schemes 5 and 6 which produce cumulative 
reductions in the £16 - £17 billion range.  The worst performer is 
Scheme 2 which results in a reduction of over £34 billion.  This result 
highlights the need for the field allowances at the higher rate of SC.  
Scheme 9 produces a cumulative loss of revenues exceeding £26 
billion. 
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Chart 101 
 
 
 
Chart 102 
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Charts 103 and 104 show the annual and cumulative changes in SC 
under the different schemes.  Schemes 5 and 6 produce the largest 
cumulative measures in SC which are in the £172 - £174 range.  The 
cost and price sensitive allowance under Scheme 5 produces a 
substantial number of new developments while leaving the more 
profitable fields subject to the higher rate of SC.    Unsurprisingly, 
Scheme 1 produces the smallest increase in SC.   
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Chart 104 
 
 
In Chart 105 the percentage tax takes under Scheme 1 are shown 
indicating a flat rate of 50%.  In Chart 106 the tax takes under Scheme 
2 are shown.  The rate is very often just higher the 62% reflecting the 
incomplete relief for decommissioning costs.  The extent of the 
increase in the rate depends on the relative size of the 
decommissioning costs. 
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Chart 106 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In Chart 107 the tax takes under Scheme 3 are shown.  The results 
indicate that in many of the new developments the tax takes under the 
2011 system (incorporating the then field allowances) are often well 
below the 62% rate with some below 30%.  There an imperfect 
relationship to project profitability, resulting from the allowances, 
reflecting the physical features rather than costs.  This is highlighted 
in Chart 108 which shows the tax takes on developments triggered by 
Scheme 3.  The results for Scheme 4 (Chart 109) are fairly similar. 
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Chart 107 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chart 108 
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Chart 109 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In Chart 110 the tax takes under Scheme 5 are shown.  While some 
are around 62% many are at lower levels, generally in the 30%-50% 
range.  A considerable number are at 30% including some with 
relatively high NPV/I ratios.  Neither the tax relief nor the investment 
hurdle puts emphasis on the relative importance of operating costs. 
Chart 110 
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To obtain further insights Chart 111 shows the tax takes on the fields 
whose development has been triggered by Scheme 5 (compared to the 
situation with SC at 32% but no field allowances).  It is seen that the 
majority of the tax takes are in the 30%-50% range, with some outliers 
at relatively low levels. 
Chart 111 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In Charts 112 and 113 the tax takes under Scheme 6 are shown.  
While there are some extra developments emanating from those 
available under current legislation the pattern of results is generally as 
for Scheme 5. 
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Chart 112 
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In Chart 114 the tax takes under Scheme 7 are shown.  The majority 
of fields face a tax rate of 62%, but there are some with considerably 
lower rates.  The tax takes on fields triggered by Scheme 7 (compared 
to no field allowances) are shown in Chart 115.  The takes are 
generally in the 30%-60% range. 
Chart 114 
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The tax takes under Scheme 8 are shown in Chart 116 and the takes 
on fields whose development is triggered by this scheme are shown in 
Chart 117.  The results are quite similar to those achieved with 
Scheme 7 and so are not discussed further. 
Chart 116 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chart 117 
  
 
Real Tax Take Scheme 8
$90/bbl and 60p/therm
Hurdle : Real NPV at 10% / Real Devex at 10% > 0.5
0.00
0.10
0.20
0.30
0.40
0.50
0.60
0.70
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Real NPV @ 10% / Pre-tax Devex at 10%
Real Tax take
Probable Possible Technical Reserves New Exploration
 
Real Tax Take Triggered by Scheme 8 Allowances
$90/bbl and 60p/therm
Hurdle : Real NPV at 10% / Real Devex at 10% > 0.5
0.00
0.10
0.20
0.30
0.40
0.50
0.60
0.70
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
Real NPV @ 10% / Pre-tax Devex at 10%
Real Tax take
Probable Possible Technical Reserves New Exploration
92 
 
The tax takes under Scheme 9 are shown in Chart 118.  They range 
from over 62% to just over 20%, with many being in the 30%-60% 
range.  Further insights to the working of the scheme are given in 
Chart 119 which shows the takes on developments which have been 
triggered by the allowances.  The takes are mostly n the range 60%-
25%.  The effective rates are not well-related to field profitability.  
Over 100 new field developments were triggered by the Scheme 9 
allowances. 
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Chart 119 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(ii) Incremental Projects  
In this section the position of incremental projects under the various 
schemes is discussed.  It was found that the viability of such projects 
under consideration by the industry was sensitive to their tax 
treatment.  The position under the four scenarios is summarised as 
follows: 
 
1. Under the $70,40 pence price 42 incremental projects failed the 
NPV/I > 0.3 hurdle with CT only.  Under Scheme 1 with SC at 
20% 49 projects failed to pass the hurdle.  Under all the other 
schemes excluding the incremental allowance with Schemes 5 and 
6.  61 projects failed to pass the hurdle.  When the incremental 
allowances for Schemes 5 and 6 were included the resulting tax 
takes on all the incremental projects are as shown in Chart 120.  It 
is seen that most of the projects still faced a tax rate of 62% or 
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more but a number did have lower rates.  A few had very low rates 
reflecting the very unusual characteristics of the projects.  The 
incremental allowance did trigger the development of some 
projects which would otherwise have failed the hurdle.  The tax 
takes on these projects are shown in Chart 121. 
Chart 120 
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2. Under the $70,40 pence price 54 incremental projects failed the 
NPV/I > 0.5 hurdle with CT only.  Under Scheme 1 with SC at 
20% 71 projects failed to pass the hurdle.  Under all the other 
schemes, excluding the incremental allowance for Schemes 5 and 
6, 80 projects failed the hurdle.  When the incremental allowance 
for Scheme 5 was included the tax takes on all the incremental 
projects were as shown in Chart 122.  The position of these 
projects whose development was triggered by the incremental 
allowance was isolated and the resulting tax takes are shown in 
Chart 123.  It is noticeable that, reflecting the cap on the size of the 
allowance, not many projects were incentivised under this 
relatively low price and higher hurdle scenario. 
 
Chart 122 
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Chart 123 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. Under the $90, 60 pence price 31 incremental projects failed the 
NPV/I > 0.3 hurdle in the CT only case.  Under Scheme 1 with SC 
= 20% 35 projects failed the hurdle.  With all the other schemes 
excluding the allowance for Schemes 5 and 6 39 projects failed the 
hurdle.  When the incremental allowance for Schemes 5 and 6 was 
included the resulting tax takes on all the incremental projects were 
as shown in Chart 124.  It is seen that the great majority face tax 
rates of 62% or more but a significant number, generally 
experiencing relatively low levels of profitability, face lower rates.  
The allowance did trigger the development of some projects and 
the resulting tax takes on these triggered fields are shown in Chart 
125. 
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Chart 124 
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4. Under the $90, 60 pence price 36 incremental projects failed the 
NPV/I > 0.5 hurdle in the CT only case.  Under Scheme 1 with SC 
at 20% 47 failed the hurdle.  Under all the other schemes excluding 
the incremental allowance for Schemes 5 and 6, 58 projects failed 
the hurdle.  When the allowance for incremental projects under 
Schemes 5 and 6 was included the resulting tax takes for all the 
projects were as shown in Chart 126.  While most projects face 
rates of 62% or more there are some with lower rates.  The 
allowance did trigger the development of some projects.  The tax 
takes on these incentivised projects are shown in Chart 127. 
 
Chart 126 
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Chart 127 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
One explanation of the pattern of the results of the introduction of 
the allowance relates to the differing characteristics of the 
incremental projects and how they interact with the Scheme 5 
allowance.  The projects vary considerably in their degree of 
capital intensity.  The allowance is geared to development costs per 
boe, and in some cases project profitability is not high because the 
operating costs per boe are high.  The incentive does not target 
such projects to the same extent as very capital intensive ones. 
 
5. Conclusions. 
In this study the short and long term consequences of various 
changes to the UK petroleum taxation system have been 
examined.  No less than nine possible tax arrangements were 
subjected to detailed economic modelling.  Emphasis was put 
on variations to the Supplementary Charge (SC), including not 
only a rate change but various field allowances including those 
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in force in 2011, those proposed in Budget 2012 and other 
schemes involving sliding scale allowances related to the 
development costs per boe of reserves, where the size of the 
allowance increases with the unit development costs but reaches 
a ceiling designed to prevent subsidies to non-economic 
projects. 
 
The modelling of the tax systems highlighted their 
consequences for (a) the pace of field developments, (b) 
production, (c) investment and operating expenditures, (d) tax 
revenues, and (e) effective tax rates.  The economic modelling 
was undertaken over a 30-year period.  Two price scenarios 
were employed namely (1) $70 and 40 pence and (2) $90 and 
60 pence, both in constant real terms and thus increasing yearly 
by the inflation rate of 2.5%.  These scenarios are designed to 
reflect screening prices for long term projects likely to be used 
by investors and their financiers.  They are not estimates of 
market values.  Two investment hurdles were employed with 
each price scenario.  These are (a) Post-tax NPV at 10%/ Pre-
tax Investment at 10% > 0.3, and (b) NPV/I > 0.5.  These are 
designed to reflect some capital rationing either self-imposed or 
imposed by external factors such as capital market conditions.  
Currently small companies are finding some difficulties in 
raising either debt or equity finance. 
 
The modelling compared the nine possible schemes with the 
corporation tax (CT) only situation under the headings noted 
above.  Generally activity levels as measured by the volume of 
investment and production over the long term were higher with 
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the CT only situation.  Only occasionally did a scheme enhance 
activity above that level.  This was where the value of the 
investment relief was high in relation to the subsequent rate of 
tax payable on the new field’s production. 
 
The modelling also found that investment and production 
incentives were reasonably well preserved by the scheme which 
related the value of the allowance (or tax credit) to the unit 
development costs per boe with a cap to prevent clear subsidies 
and a floor of zero to ensure that low-cost fields were not given 
the allowance.  This scheme also performed reasonably well 
because it directly acknowledged the problem of the much 
lower value of gas compared to oil. 
 
The system in place at Budget 2012 also performed reasonably 
well in preserving investment incentives and production.  The 
allowances were found to have a substantial effect in enhancing 
investment and production levels above those which would 
have prevailed in the absence of the field allowances.  It was 
found that a system of SC at 32% with no field allowances 
would have had a catastrophic long-term negative effect on 
investment and production.  Further, there were found to be 
significant extra benefits in terms of activity levels from the 
increase in these allowances from those in place in 2011 to 
those proposed in Budget 2012. 
 
With respect to the effects on tax revenues it was found that 
over the long term the schemes with an allowance based on 
development costs per boe and that incorporated in Budget 2012 
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performed well in the sense of collecting large extra revenues to 
the Exchequer.  These schemes achieve this through a 
combination of incentivising new developments and taxing 
more profitable fields at the 62% rate.  From the viewpoint of 
extra tax revenues the scheme with the lower SC rate of 20% 
(without field allowances) does not perform so well even 
though it does incentivise more developments. 
 
Closer examination of the operation of the various schemes was 
undertaken by calculating the percentage tax takes and relating 
these to the profitability of the field in question.  It was found 
that, while the scheme incorporated in Budget 2012 facilitated 
the development of fields which were non-viable in the absence 
of the allowances, some other fields which already passed the 
hurdle were also helped.  The result is that the effective tax rates 
can hardly be said to be progressively related to profitability.  
Another finding was that in a few cases where the field income 
was small the effect of the field allowance combined with the 
relief for the investment costs at 62% was to produce a low 
effective tax rate. 
 
The system which related the size of the tax allowance (credit) 
to investment costs per boe clearly does help in a progressive 
manner though the effective rates of tax were not always 
progressively related to overall field profitability.  One reason 
for this outcome is the varying degree of capital intensity of the 
new fields and projects.  The allowance highlights the 
investment or capital costs but does not deal with variations in 
operating costs.  A virtue of the scheme based on investment 
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costs per boe (with a cap) is that it can ensure that very low tax 
rates are normally not produced.  From this viewpoint this 
scheme performed more efficiently than that in Budget 2012. 
 
It is clear from the study that incremental projects in mature 
fields can be deterred by the current tax system.  The modelling 
found that in the cases with CT only and with SC at 20% 
considerably more incremental projects were viable compared 
to the situation with SC at 32% but without special allowances 
for these projects. 
 
The scheme with the sliding-scale allowance related to 
investment costs per boe contains such an allowance for 
incremental projects.  It was found that this scheme incentivised 
a worthwhile number of incremental projects.  The modelling 
considered only those incremental projects likely to come to 
fruition over the next 3 years.  Further projects are likely to 
become available in the longer term and, if these had been 
included, the effects of such an allowance on investment and 
production would have been stronger.  There is a clear case for 
an incentive scheme for incremental projects in the UKCS, 
particularly in PRT-paying fields where the tax rate is now 
81%. 
 
The sliding-scale scheme related to investment costs per boe 
represents an attempt to employ only economic elements in the 
design of an efficient tax system.  This is to be commended.  
The route chosen by the UK Government is to employ physical 
factors as proxies for costs.  In defence of this it can be said that 
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the result in Budget 2012 is a scheme which both incentivises 
new developments and procures worthwhile revenues from new 
developments.  But the allowance system has already become 
very complex and it is inevitable that some economically 
marginal projects will not qualify for relief because they do not 
quite fit the physical definitions in the legislation.  Thus a quasi-
permanent, time-consuming negotiation may well ensue with a 
multiplication of qualifying criteria. 
 
This study has only examined tax arrangements either reflecting 
recent and current practice or variations being examined with 
the industry.  No other schemes have been discussed.  But an 
alternative scheme based on the resource rent tax concept 
deserves further consideration.  The concept is already well-
established for investors not in a tax-paying position and could 
be adapted to handle situations where the investor is already in a 
tax-paying position. 
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Appendix 
Tax System for New Fields 
CT at 30% 
SC at 32% (from 2011) 
 All E and A and D costs deductible on 100% first year basis 
Budget 2009 introduced: 
 Value Allowance for Supplementary Charge  
 
Budget 2009 
 The field allowance for small fields is £75 million for fields with 
oil reserves (or gas equivalent) of 2.75 million tonnes or less, 
reducing on a straight line basis to nil for fields over 3.5 million 
tonnes.  In any one year the maximum field allowance (for a field 
with total allowance of £75 million) is £15 million. 
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 The field allowance for ultra heavy oil fields is £800 million for 
fields with an American Petroleum Institute gravity below 18 
degrees and a viscosity of more than 50 centipoise at reservoir 
temperature and pressure.  In any one year the maximum field 
allowance is £160 million. 
 The field allowance for ultra high temperature/pressure fields is 
£800 million for fields with a temperature of more than 176.67 
degrees Celsius and pressure of more than 1034 bar in the reservoir 
formation.  In any one year the maximum field allowance is £160 
million. 
 
PBR 2009 
 In PBR 2009 qualifying criteria for HP/HT fields modified to 
166°C and 862 bar.  Allowance increases on SL basis from £500m. 
at 166°C to £800m. at 176.6°C. 
 In January 2010 field allowance of up to £80m. (max. £160m. in any 1 
year) extended to remote, deep-water gas fields. 
 Qualifying criteria:  
(a) gas more than 75% of reserves 
(b) field located in water depth > 300 metres 
(c) distance from field to relevant infrastructure > 60 km. Allowance 
increases linearly from £0 at 60k. to £800m. at 120 km. 
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Budget 2011 
SC increased from 20% to 32% 
 Tax Rates 
 Pre Budget Post Budget 
PRT fields 75% 81% 
Non-PRT fields 50% 62% 
 
 Decommissioning Relief 
 Pre Budget Post Budget 
PRT fields 75% 69%/75% 
Non-PRT fields 50% 50% 
 
July 2011  
Increase in Ring Fence Expenditure Supplement from 6% to 10%. 
 
Budget 2012  
1. Field allowances to be extended to fields already developed 
(incremental projects). 
2. Small field allowance increased from total of £75m. to £150m. and 
size of qualifying fields increased from 2.75m. tonnes or less to 
6.25m. tonnes or less.  The extended allowance is tapered to zero 
at 7m. tonnes (compared to 3.5m. tonnes now). 
3. New £3bn. field allowance for new fields with qualifying criteria. 
(a) Water depth > 1000 metres 
(b) Minimum reserves of 25m. tonnes 
(c) Maximum reserves of 40m. tonnes with taper to £0 at 55m. 
tonnes 
4. The Government will introduce legislation in Finance Bill 2013 
giving it statutory authority to sign contracts with companies 
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operating in the UK an UK Continental Shelf, to provide assurance 
on the relief they will receive when decommissioning assets.  The 
Government will consult further on the precise form and details of 
such contracts in the coming months. 
 
 
 
 
 
